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A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE (SOMETIMES UNEASY) 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIGITAL INFORMATION AND CERTAIN LEGAL 
FIELDS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND UGANDA 
 
D Van der Merwe
* 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Before having a look at the legal questions addressed in the present article, it might 
be wise to set out the facts that typically give rise to such legal questions. Da mihi 
facta, dabo tibi ius,
1 should be the slogan of every careful jurist. 
 
Governments have traditionally spied upon their own citizens, usually in the name of 
"security of the state". Hermann Göring, head of the German secret police
2 during 
the Hitler-era, used a device to  "bug" the telephones of foreign embassies as well 
those of its own citizens suspected of being critical of Hitler.
3  This practice was 
extended (with more sophisticated technology) by the secret police
4 of the former 
state  of  East  Germany.  It  is  ironic  that  the  prese nt  chancellor  of  a  free  and 
democratic Germany, Angela Merkel, now finds herself being spied upon by (modern 
digital) technological devices used by the United States ' National Security Agency 
(NSA)  and  by  the United  Kingdom 's  Government  Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ).  Apparently  she  was  not  alone  in  being  targeted  by  these  two 
"democracies". Similar devices were also used against President Rouseff of Brazil, 
Ban Ki-Moen (the UN Secretary-General), the Pope and many others.
5 The activities 
of the United States in this regard have been exposed by whistleblower Dennis 
Snowden, who has had to apply for and receive political asylum from Russia (even 
                                        
*   Dana van der Merwe. B.Jur (UPE), LLB and LLD (Unisa). Formerly Professor in Public Law at the 
University  of  South  Africa,  at  present  Research  Fellow  at  that  institution.  Email: 
vdmerdp@mweb.co.za. 
1   "Give me the facts and I shall give you the law". 
2   The Gestapo. 
3   Scholtz Beeld. 
4   The Stasi. 
5   Napolitano  2013  ht tp://reason.com/archives/2013/11/07/how-can-the-nsa-spy-on-merkel-the-
pope-t. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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more ironical!). What is especially shocking is that the NSA infrastructure is by now 
so powerful (and well-funded by the US government) that it is  able to intercept 
literally ALL electronic communication across the world. The sifting for information 
out of all that data can come later. 
 
Is the law able to provide any guidance in this struggle between governments and 
travellers on the "Information Highway"? 
 
In a number of previous articles, published in various legal journals,
6 the present 
author has explored the convoluted relationship between information and the law. 
This relationship has often been problematic because of the rapidly changing nature 
of  the  technological  infrastructure  of  the  former  concept  and  the  inherent 
conservatism of the latter. The uneasy juxtaposition described above has also been 
the motivation behind both of my published works, entitled Computers and the Law
7 
as well as (in its latest embodiment)  Information and Communications Technology 
Law.
8 
 
Other authors, locally as well as overseas, have also engaged upon this quest. The 
very first book on the topic came from United Kingdom author Colin Tapper.
9 In his 
introduction to the work,
10 the author asks whether  "there is any more need for a 
book on the law of computers than there is for one on the law of typewriters or 
tuning forks". The book then discusses the admissibility of digital documents in the 
law of evidence, the new problems that copyright in digital creations has brought 
about, the "dramatic emergence for the personal privacy of human beings" and also 
problems  arising  from  the  abuse  of  computer  systems .  The  work  is  the  more 
valuable for the fact that UK law is contrasted with US law in a comparative fashion 
throughout. 
                                        
6   For instance Van der Merwe  1983 Obiter; Van der Merwe  1985 SACC; Van der Merwe  1994 
Obiter; Van der Merwe 2007 THRHR. 
7   Van der Merwe Computers and the Law 1986 and 2000. 
8   Van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law. 
9   Tapper Computer Law. 
10   Tapper Computer Law xxiii. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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Besides the works by van der Merwe mentioned above, other South African authors 
have  also  entered  upon  the  digital  terrain.  One  of  the  first  of  these  works  was 
Cyberlaw
11 by Hofman. Although dated in certain respects, this title still contains one 
of the best explanations of PKI
12  and the X.509 technical standard for creating 
reliable digital signatures.
13 
 
South Africa has also seen three editions of Cyberlaw@SA.
14 These works have had 
almost each chapter written by different authors and the contributing set of authors 
has also changed considerably between given editions. The chapters in the latest 
edition on Privacy and Data Protection,
15 Electronic Evidence
16 and "Cybercrime and 
the investigation of cybercrime"
17 will be dealt with as being especially relevant to 
the subject matter of the present article. 
 
The last-mentioned work reveals a possible problem when dealing with ICT Law in 
this  manner.  Each  of  the  chapters  seems  to  have  been  written  independently 
without a bird's eye-view of the field as a whole, and thus without making the cross-
references required
 18 The book simply reflects the idiosyncratic stance of each of 
the  established  legal  disciplines  with  regard  to  the  new  phenomenon  of  digital 
information, for which it seems these disciplines were not yet quite ready. Each legal 
field  seems  therefore  to  have  developed  its  own  "coping  mechanism"  to  try  to 
accommodate this newborn but unruly child. 
 
In the opinion of the present author only a holistic approach to this new legal field 
can hope to succeed. Whether it be called  "Computer Law",  "CyberLaw" or "ICT 
                                        
11   Hofman Cyberlaw. 
12   Public Key Infrastructure. 
13   Hofman  Cyberlaw. 71ff. For an interesting update, especially as far as digital sig natures are 
concerned, see Hofman "South Africa" 483. 
14   The first and second editions (with Buys as editor) appeared in 1999 and 2004 respectively (Buys 
Cyberlaw@SA  1999  and 2004). The third edition ( Papadopoulos  and Snail  Cyberlaw@SA)  is 
utilised for the purposes of the present article. 
15   Papadopoulos and Snail. 
16   Meintjes-van der Walt. 
17   Watney. 
18   This is also manifest in the fact that each chapter commences with a new set of footnotes. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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law", a whole set of new considerations from the digital world impinges upon a legal 
system based on the analogue world.
19 
 
The present article borrows from the US for many of its factual scenarios,
20 but then 
strives to apply African law to solve similar problems that might arise on this 
continent.  It  will  be  shown  that  there  are  three  main  role -players  as  far  as 
information is concerned, namely the state (although it sometimes tries to be both 
referee  and  player),  the  public  (whose  right  to  electronic  privacy  needs  to  be 
protected) and the purveyors of merchandise over the Internet by means of so -
called "electronic commerce".
21 The role that the law is supposed to play in this 
(already) difficult task of giving to each his (or her) due is complicated by the fact 
that some of these problems are international in nature. It is suggested that such 
jurisdictional problems need to be addressed urgently, for instance by multi -  or 
bilateral treaties between countries. 
 
2  The law of privacy 
 
2.1  Multi-lateral treaties 
 
As far as privacy is concerned, the entire second section of the African Union's Draft 
Convention  on  Cyber-legislation  in  Africa  deals  with  this  topic  specifically.  The 
Convention  distinguishes  between  "Personal  Data",  "Sensitive  Data"  and  "Health 
Data". The first concept is defined as: 
 
… any information relating to a physical person directly or indirectly identified or 
identifiable by reference to an identification number or to one or several elements 
relating  to  his/her  physical,  physiological,  genetic,  psychic,  cultural,  social  or 
economic identity.
22 
 
                                        
19   Intellectual Property (IP) constitutes an uneasy "halfway" stage between traditional rights based 
on tangibles and the new rights based on digital "property". However, this topic falls outside the 
ambit of the present article. 
20   As with IT, the US also seems to be the pioneer as far as IT crime is concerned. 
21   Better known as "e-commerce". 
22   Part II, s 1, A II-1.4 Draft Convention on Cyber-legislation in Africa (2012). D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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Of interest also is the way in which these concepts may affect and influence each 
other, as is expressed by the Convention's definition of "Interconnection of Personal 
Data": 
 
(A)ny connection mechanism that harmonizes processed data designed for a set 
goal  with  other  data  processed  for  goals  that  are  identical  or  otherwise,  or 
interlinked by one or several processing official(s).
23 
 
This would include the systematization of otherwise meaningless data into valuable 
information. Of course, this very process might have negative implications for the 
privacy of the individuals whose personal data is being processed. 
 
Part  II  Section  III  of  the  Convention  sets  out  an  institutional  framework  for  a 
"protection authority" to be tasked with the protection of personal data in each state 
of the African Union. Failure to comply with the prescribed guidelines may lead to 
"adversarial proceedings"
24 in order to ensure compliance. 
 
At first glance South Africa does not seem to have become part of any supra -
national privacy protection network as yet. Nonetheless it does form part of the 
SADC
25  grouping of states, which has issued a  Draft Model Law on Crime and 
Cybercrime. Although prima facie this provision does not appear to have anything to 
do with privacy, one of its sections
26 deals with "Data Espionage". This occurs when 
any person unlawfully  "obtains computer data which are not meant for him and 
which are specially  protected against unauthorized access ". The reference to a 
"person" seems to indicate that this crime is not committed by states or on behalf of 
states infringing upon the privacy of an individual. This has to do with a person 
gaining access to the forbidden fruits of government information. 
 
                                        
23   Part II, s 1, A II-1.8 of the Draft Convention on Cyber-legislation in Africa (2012). 
24   This phrase is wide enough to cover both adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings, depending on 
the system of procedure applicable in the state concerned. 
25   Southern African Development Community. 
26   S 8 of the SADC Draft Model Law on Crime and Cybercrime (2012). D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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An unsettling report entitled Humanitarian Trends in Southern Africa: Challenges and 
Opportunities has recently been drawn up by 33 researchers from the Universities of 
Antananarivo in Madagascar, North-West, Stellenbosch and Lesotho. According to 
the  report  the  tension  between  "limited  governance",  a  youthful  population  and 
increasing access to cellular technology makes for an explosive mixture in Southern 
Africa.  Four  countries,  namely  Angola,  the  Comores,  Malawi  and  Zimbabwe  are 
described  as  "fragile  states"  which  do  not  comply  with  the  expectations  of  their 
citizens.  The  ability  to  organise  mass  meetings  rapidly  by  means  of  cell-phones 
constitutes a "fire hazard".
27 
 
Uganda  already  forms  part  of  the  East  African  Commu nity  (EAC)  Cyber-laws 
Framework.
28 In contrast to South Africa, a significant part of this framework does 
contain legal provisions on the protection of personal privacy.
29 
 
Uganda's parliament would therefore have to make sure that its local legislation 
complies  with  the  Community 's  Cyber-laws  Framework  (Phase  I).  Part  of  this 
Framework  focuses  on  privacy  and  recognizes  the  "critical  importance  of  data 
protection and privacy” and recommends that further work needs to carried out on 
this issue, to ensure that 
 
(a) the privacy of citizens is not eroded through the Internet;  
(b) that legislation providing for access to official information is appropriately taken 
into account;  
and to take into account: 
(c) the institutional implications of such reforms and  
(d) the international best practice in that area. 
 
                                        
27   Claasen Beeld. The expression "fire hazard" is that of the present author. 
28   This Framework includes the countries of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. 
29   S 2.5 of the EAC Cyber-laws Framework (2009) on "Data Protection and Privacy". D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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2.2  Domestic legislation - South Africa (with some reference to the USA) 
 
Virtually the only protection against an over-inquisitive government
30 seems to lie in 
a  constitutionally  guaranteed  right  to  privacy.  South  Africa  is  in  the  fortunate 
position  of  having  a  supreme  Constitution,
31  which  may  be  enforced  by  the 
Constitutional Court. Section 14(d) of the 1996 Constitution deals with "Privacy" as 
follows: "Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have the 
privacy of their communications infringed." 
 
A new Privacy Act has just been adopted by Parliament during its current session.
32 
This long-awaited piece of legislation has  as its stated goal the protection of the 
personal information of citizens of South Africa. The entire gestation project leading 
up to the new Act was undertaken under the aegis of the South African Law Reform 
Commission
33 in a project entitled "Privacy and data protection".
34 Hopefully this new 
law will finally make concrete the lofty ideals with regard to privacy expressed in the 
Constitution. 
 
The authors of the work ICT Law
35 expressed the opinion that the provisions of the 
new Act would probably replace t he data protection provisions contained in the 
existing Electronic Communications and Transactions Act.
36 There is a dire need for 
this progression, since the latter Act provides only for a voluntary regime of data 
protection with no sanctions attached to a failure to adopt such a regime. That said, 
the new Privacy Act seems to be geared more towards administrative control and 
oversight  than  towards  directly  criminalising  deviations  from  the  prescribed 
procedures and standards. 
 
                                        
30   Although one would also like legal protection against nosey fellow citizens, this is not the focus 
of the present article. 
31   An interim version was passed in 1994 and the final version in 1996. 
32   Protection  of  Personal  Information  Act   4  of  2013,  signed  by  President  Zuma  on  the  19
th 
November 2013. 
33   The SALRC. 
34   SALRC Privacy and Data Protection. 
35   Van der Merwe et al Information Communications Technology Law 368. 
36   Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (ECT Act). D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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The gist of the new legislation deals with the "processing" of "personal information" 
pertaining to a "data subject" by a "responsible party".
37 The protection of personal 
information already formed part of the (Roman -Dutch) common law of delict in 
South  Africa  and  has  since  been  comprehensively  affirmed  both  by  academic 
writing
38 as well as in decided cases.
39 The new statutory protection is to be afforded 
through administrative control by means of a "regulator", rather than by resorting to 
litigation. 
 
If a person feels aggrieved by (what he or she believes to be) false information held 
by someone else, that person has another option: he (or she) may also act in terms 
of the Promotion of Access to Information Act.
40 According to the provisions of the 
last-mentioned Act, the respondent has to provide the requester access to the 
information concerned, whether such information is held in hard copy or in digital 
format. The requester would then be able to decide whether or not to pursue further 
legal redress. 
 
Although  the  National  Credit  Act
41  also  deals  with  information,  and  often  with 
information that the data subject would have preferred to keep private, it has a 
different  "flavour"  to most other data protection legislation. This is because the 
statute now deals with information that starts off being private, but which might 
have to be disclosed later on because of the increasingly commercial nature of such 
information.
42 
 
Almost as a counterweight to the Privacy Act discussed above, the South African 
Government has now countered with its own  Protection of State Information Bill  
                                        
37   Van  der  Merwe  et  al  Information  Communications  Technology  Law  313ff;  Papadopoulos  and 
Snail Cyberlaw@SA 275ff. 
38   Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict. 
39   O'Keeffe vs Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 3 SA 244 (C); National Media Ltd v Jooste 
1996 3 SA 262 (A); Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd vs Sage Holdings Ltd  1993 2 SA 453 (SA); Janit v 
Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd 1995 4 SA 293 (A) - this list is not comprehensive. 
40   Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA). 
41   National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
42   See  Papadopoulos  and  Snail   Cyberlaw@SA  298;  Van  der  Merwe  et  al  Information 
Communications Technology Law 364ff. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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(POSI).
43 This would appear to look after the information interests of the state, as 
opposed  to  those  of  its  citizens.  The  POSI  Bill  is  supposed  to  deal  with  the 
classification, protection and dissemination of state information. The problem is that 
the government now appears to be using powers given to it for a different purpose 
(to act as the referee in the information game) in order to guard its own secrets (as 
a player in that game). This might just be an instance of  Quis custodiet custodes 
ipsos?
44 
 
Rumour hath it that President Zuma is also about to sign into force the  General 
Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill  (GILA),
45  which will give the government the 
power to monitor and intercept  "foreign"  communications. For this purpose, the 
government proposes merging all existing intelligence organisations into an umbrella 
body - the overarching "State Security Agency". 
 
Also slightly disturbing are the suggested amendments
46 to the ECT Act. Section 1 of 
the  Bill  sets  out  new  definitions  of  "critical  information",  "critical  information 
infrastructure" and a "critical information infrastructure administrator". Sections 53 
to 58 then deal with the identification, registration, management and audit of such 
critical information infrastructures. Clarifying the concept of a  "critical information 
structure" is apparently left to the discretion of the Minister of Communications: 
 
The Minister may by notice in the Gazette- 
(a) declare certain classes of information which is of importance to the protection of 
the national security of the Republic or the economic and social well-being of its 
citizens to be critical information for the purposes of this Chapter; and  
(b)  establish  procedures  to  be  followed  in  the  identification  of  national  critical 
information infrastructure for the purposes of this Chapter.
47 
 
The only hope that a citizen would have against his or her own government acting in 
terms of the above legislation would seem to lie in the South African Constitution. 
                                        
43   Popularly known as the "Secrecy Bill". 
44   "Who guards the guardians themselves"? 
45   Popularly known as the "Spy Bill". 
46   As  published  in  concept  form  in  GN  888  in  GG  35821  of  28  October  2012  ( Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Amendment Bill). 
47   Suggested replacement for s 53 of the ECT Act. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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The  Constitutional  Court  has  a  right  to  test  all  forms  of  local  legislation  for 
compatibility  with  the  values  enshrined  in  the  Constitution.  If  such  a  law  has 
transgressed the last-mentioned values, the Court would have the power to declare 
null and void such provisions as are in conflict with the Constitution. For this reason 
it is very important that the judges appointed to serve in this court do not carry with 
them  any  political  affiliation  that  might  cloud  their  judgment.  In  this  regard  the 
examples of famous American Justices such as Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and Louis 
Brandeis
48 should serve as continuing inspiration for our own Constitutional Court to 
protect  South  African  citizens  against  the  ever -increasing  powers  of  the  State. 
Brandeis was, of course, the co-author of a seminal article on privacy, which has set 
the tone of the debate on this topic ever since.
49 
 
As  may  be  seen  from  the  proposed  legislation  discuss ed  above,  besides  the 
commercial  players  in  e -commerce,
50  government  itself  might  now  constitute  a 
threat to online privacy, claiming security considerations as justification. Instead of 
merely being the enforcer and protector of the private rights of its citizens, the 
modern state has now itself become a player in the information game and its rights 
in this regard could, and have, come into conflict with those of its citizens as far as 
mutually destructive claims to information are concerned. 
 
A source of revelation to the present author in this regard has been  the work The 
New Digital Age,
51 by Eric Schmidt (the Executive Chairman of Google) and Jarred 
Cohen (the Director of Google Ideas). The authors speak of a  "push-pull between 
privacy and security in the digital age " and expect things to become much worse 
before they become better: 
 
The  authorities  responsible  for  locating,  monitoring  and  capturing  dangerous 
individuals will require massive, highly sophisticated data-management systems to 
                                        
48   See  para  3.2  below  for  a  case  where  these  three  American  Judges  of  Appeal  held  that  an 
opinion, no matter how "loathsome", deserved protection under the law unless the safety of the 
State itself was threatened. 
49   Brandeis and Warren 1890 Harv LJ. 
50   Who disregard privacy considerations in order to perform online marketing and advertising. 
51   Schmidt and Cohen New Digital Age. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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do so. Despite everything individuals, corporations and dedicated nonprofit groups 
are doing to protect privacy, these systems will inevitably include volumes of data 
about non-terrorist citizens - the questions are how much and where.
52 
 
A number of American citizens have already illustrated their protest against similar 
actions by these "authorities" (in the shape of the US government) by becoming 
conscientious offenders.
53 The first of these was one Philip Zimmermann, who had 
created a data-encryption programme called PGP.
54 However, the programme was 
classified as a "munition" in terms of US law and accordingly banned from export. 
Zimmermann thereupon published the source code in a book.
55 This was not subject 
to the same restrictions since  "printed matter"  is protected in terms of the First 
Amendment to the US  Constitution. The popular movement that grew around this 
campaign has come to be known as "Wikileaks".
56 
 
Followers  of  this  popular  movement  have  repeatedly  clashed  with  the  US 
government.
57 Amongst these have been Aaron Swartz, aged 26, a programmer who 
committed  suicide  while  awaiting  trial  upon  a  charge  of  hacking  an  academic 
computer  at  MIT.  Private  Bradley  Manning,  aged  25,  was  convicted  for  giving 
classified files to  "Wikileaks"  after being charged not only with stealing military 
secrets, but also in terms of the  Espionage Act and with a charge of  "aiding the 
enemy".
58 He may face up to 134 years in prison. Edward Snowden, aged 29, has 
since gained political asylum in Russia after a highly publicized flight from the US, 
where he worked as an intelligence analyst.  
 
Were these prosecutions really necessary to protect the state against its own citizens 
or are they merely signs of a generation gap between (young) creators and (old) 
enforcers? 
                                        
52   Schmidt and Cohen New Digital Age 173. 
53   For a popular version of this conflict see Scherer 2013 Time. 
54   An acronym for "Pretty Good Privacy". 
55   Zimmermann  PGP Source Code and Internals   MIT (Massachusetts Institute for Technology) 
Press. 
56   An obvious pun on the Internet online encyclopedia called "Wikipedia". 
57   Mention of these cases will be made again below when specifically discussing criminal law. 
58   See Anon 2013 Time 13. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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2.3  Domestic legislation - Uganda 
 
This East-African country is also in the fortunate position of having a Constitution 
that affirms the protection of privacy as a right of Ugandan citizens.
59 The relevant 
provision reads as follows: 
 
No  person  shall  be  subjected  with  the  interference  of  the  privacy  of  his  home, 
correspondence, communications or other property. 
 
It  is  interesting  that  the  Ugandan  Human  Rights  Commission  (UHRC)  has  been 
tasked to deal with the delimitation of conflicting rights and that this matter is not 
left to the courts. The country also does not have a Data Protection Authority, as is 
the case in many other countries.
60 The UHRC would therefore be the sole body 
handling all complaints arising out of the abuse of rights relating to privacy. 
 
One can only hope that members of the UHRC are not simply civil servants owing 
allegiance to the Executive, otherwise the separation of powers between the three 
arms of government would have come to naught. 
 
3  Security, criminal law and evidential provisions pertaining thereto 
 
3.1  Multilateral treaties 
 
In the area of criminal law, the best-known example in this regard is probably the 
Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime.
61 It has classified computer crime 
into three categories, namely  "Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of computer data and syste ms",
62 computer-related offences,
63 content-
                                        
59   By means of s 27 of the Constitution. 
60   Hopefully this will also be the situation in South Africa by the time that the present article is 
published. 
61   Convention on Cybercrime  (2011) drawn up in Budapest, Hungary on the 23
rd  of  November 
2011.  A  sufficient  number  of  countries  (also  outside  of  Europe)  have  by  now  ratified  the 
Convention so that it has come into force. 
62   Title 1, including actions such as "hacking" and "phishing". 
63   Title 2, including actions such as computer-related forgery and fraud. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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related offences
64 and offences relating to infringements of copyright and related 
rights. 
 
This  seems  to  be  an  excellent  instrument  by  means  of  which  to  co -operate 
internationally. Although South Africa apparently  signed the treaty, it has not yet 
been able to ratify it. Even though this country complies substantively with the 
criminal and evidential conditions of the Act, our legislature has not yet placed the 
proper  infrastructures  and  procedures  in  place  so  as  to   comply  with  all  the 
requirements necessary to be in a position to ratify the treaty.
65  
 
South Africa forms part of the grouping of countries to which the Draft Southern 
African Development Community's Model Law on Crime and Cybercrime was meant 
to apply. The Model Law recommends that, besides those offences already covered 
in South Africa's ECT Act, new crimes should be added, such as "Illegal Remaining", 
Data  Espionage,  Identity -related  crimes,  Crimes  relating  to  Racism  and 
Xenophobia,
66 "Denial of Homicide and Crimes against Humanity", Spam, "Disclosure 
of  details  of  an  Investigation ",
67  "Failure  to  permit  Assistance "
68  and  Electronic 
Harassment.  The  Model  Law  also  contains  important  provisions  with  regard  to 
evidential proof and jurisdiction. 
 
In the author's personal view the splitting up of co -operation treaties into various 
disparate  regions  is  a  pity.  The  adoption  of  a  single,  worldwide  basis  for  co -
operation would have constituted a more significant step forward. 
 
As stated above, Uganda is part of the East African Community (EAC) and therefore 
partly responsible for the UN Conference on Trade and Development 's Draft EAC 
                                        
64   Mostly relating to online child pornography. 
65   Van der Merwe et al Information Communications Technology Law 101ff. 
66   A Greek-derived word that literally means "fear of foreigners". 
67   This would seem to have important implications for the freedom of the press. 
68   This apparently relates to situations with regard to the search of premises (s 25 of the  SADC 
Draft Model Law on Crime and Cybercrime (2012)) and the production of data from a computer 
system or by an Internet service provider (s 27 of the Model Law). D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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Framework for Cyber-laws (Phase I).
69 This contains a suggested legal framework 
for electronic transactions, electronic signatures and authentication, computer crime 
and consumer protection, as well as data protection and privacy. 
 
3.2  South Africa (with a comparative view regarding the USA) 
 
In all probability, no legal field has been affected more by the arrival of the digital 
world  than  the  Law  of  Evidence.  For  centuries  this  field  had  been  content  with 
distinguishing between objects of evidential value that could be classified as real
70 
evidence and other objects
71 that bore marks, symbols or writing with a meaning 
independent  from  the  surface  they  had  been  inscribed  upon,  which  could  be 
classified as documentary evidence. 
  
Some  commentators  have  argued  for  the  creation  of  an  entirely  new  field  of 
evidence  that  could  stand  independently,  apart  from  the  traditional  di stinction 
between things and documentary evidence.
72  This question becomes particularly 
acute with regard to documentary evidence because of the latter 's possible hearsay 
nature and the attendant matters of reliability (both of the machine and of its 
operator) and the weight to be accorded such evidence. Some South African courts 
have treated computer-based evidence as real evidence and other courts have seen 
it as documentary evidence.
73 
 
The present author has already recommended
74 that a deeper distinction be adopted 
in the above regard. It is based on a work by Eastlake and Niles entitled  Secure 
XML:  The  New  Syntax  for  Signatures  and  Encryption .  The  authors  distinguish 
                                        
69   Draft EAC Framework for Cyber-laws (Phase I) (2008). Phase II deals mainly with intellectual 
property issues and although of great commercial interest, falls outside the scope of the present 
article. 
70   Originating from the Latin word res, meaning a thing. 
71   Usually "paper" from the Egyptian  papyrus plant. Even though the substance later changed to 
wood pulp, the name remained the same. 
72   See Schmidt and Rademeyer Bewysreg 358ff. 
73   Schmidt and Rademeyer Bewysreg 366 and cases such as S v De Villiers 1993 1 SACR 574 (Nm); 
S v Harper 1981 1 SA 88 (D); S v Howard (Johannesburg Regional Magistrates Court) unreported 
case number 41/258/02. 
74   In Van der Merwe et al Information Communications Technology Law 128. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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between the so-called "paper"  and "protocol"-approaches
75. The former approach 
attempts to squeeze digital documents into the traditional paper mould, with so -
called "originals" being admissible as evidence and "copies" probably not admissible, 
as  being  less  reliable.  The  problem  is,  of  course,  that  nowadays  99%  of  all 
documents are produced by a digital computer and the only way to produce a true 
original would be to have a human sign one of the many printouts possible from the 
data stored on the computer. The signatory would also have to do so by means of a 
"wet"  signature,
76  because of the suspicion with which digital signatures are still 
viewed by many businessmen, despite the fact that such signatures may be made 
almost foolproof. 
 
The latter so-called "protocol" approach takes a much more revolutionary approach. 
The authors describe this approach as follows: 
 
PROTOCOL: What is important are bits on the wire generated and consumed by 
computer protocol processes. The bits are marshaled into composite messages that 
can have a rich multilevel structure. No person ever sees the full message, as such; 
rather it is viewed as a whole only by a 'geek'
77 when debugging – even then he or 
she sees some translated visible form. If you ever have to demonstrate something 
about such a message in a court or to a third party, there isn't any way to avoid 
having experts interpret it. Sometimes proponents of the protocol orientation forget 
that pieces of such messages are actually included in or influence data displayed to 
a person.
78 
 
Depending on the answer given to the above matters, entirely different approaches 
have to be followed by the litigating parties and entirely different skills might be 
needed to evaluate such evidence. The emphasis on experts in the above quotation 
seems to show clearly that we are dealing with real and not documentary evidence. 
 
It is also significant that the whole exercise as described above is to ensure that 
documentary evidence in electronic format is acceptable as evidence and also to 
ensure that proper evidential weight is given to such evidence. In this regard, new 
                                        
75   Eastlake and Niles Secure XML 469. 
76   In other words, one produced by the use of an old-fashioned pen and ink. 
77   One whose interests lie exclusively in IT, (almost) to the exclusion of everything else. 
78   Eastlake and Niles Secure XML 470. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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data formats such as XML
79 and XBRL
80 not only provide more security with regard 
to electronic signatures, but also provide criteria by means of which the evidential 
weight of such evidence may be weighed. 
 
ICT security involves a careful evaluation of  the security risks to the user 's ICT 
assets, resources and activities and involves the formulation and quantification of 
countermeasures.
81 The latter should be embodied in an enterprise-wide IT security 
policy and the Human Resources Division concerned should see to it that acceptance 
of the obligations in terms of such a policy forms part of an employee's conditions of 
service. 
 
Standards are of the greatest importance in achieving adequate IT security, and in 
this regard ISO
82 17799 plays a pivotal role. A t the same time adherence to such 
standards may also help provide reliable proof in disputed matters.
83  It is also 
important that the procedures in creating electronic signatures be accredited by an 
authoritative  body.  The  South  African  Accreditation  Author ity  (SAAA)  has  now 
accredited a procedure by means of regulation.
84 
 
Coming  to  Criminal  Law  -  this  legal  field usually  constitutes  the  last  resort  to 
desperate data  "owners"  when security measures have proved to be insufficient. 
When surveying the panoply o f legislation in this era the question arises as to 
exactly what public interest is being protected by a particular statute. 
 
                                        
79   eXtensible Markup Language. See Van der Merwe 2010 THRHR. 
80   eXtensible Business Resources Language. See Van der Merwe 2011 THRHR. 
81   See  Van der Merwe  et al Information Communications Technology Law   64 and the sources 
quoted. 
82   International Standards Organisation. 
83   If such a standard is an international one, it would also address problems of jurisdiction and 
proof where overseas parties are involved. 
84   GN 504 in GG 29995 of 20 July 2007 ( Regulations relating to Authentication Service Providers). 
See  also  Papadopoulos  and  Snail  Cyberlaw@SA  123;  Van  der  Merwe  et  al  Information 
Communications  Technology  Law   127.  A  Centurion -based  South  African  firm  has  recently 
implemented  the  standard  successfully  and  obtained  permission  from  the  Department  of 
Communications to advertise their advanced digital signatures as ECT-compliant. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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Normally the criminal law allows the state to intervene against one of its citizens 
who  has  proved  to  be  a  danger  to  his  (or  her)  fellow  citizens  and  needs  to  be 
removed from society for a while. This would serve a number of purposes at the 
same time. In the first place the individual would (hopefully) be deterred by the 
punishment  from  ever  transgressing  again  in  the  future.
85  In the  second place 
society, when taking note of the punishment imposed, would be satisfied that justice 
has been done and would not be tempted to take the law into its own hands.
86 
Thirdly, members of that society would normally decide that  "crime does not pay" 
and refrain from embarking upon a similar course of criminal conduct.
87 Finally, since 
the convicted accused is languishing in prison while serving, for instance,  "three life 
sentences",
88 he is prevented from committing any further crimes (at least outside of 
prison). 
 
It seems, therefore, that the protection of its citizens against crime should be the 
main aim and justification of state -imposed punishment. Applying this principle to 
the field of information implies that the state should criminalise acts such as hacking 
into someone's computer, or obtaining money from duped Internet users who think 
they are helping a Nigerian user obtain a sum of money allegedly owed to him by 
the government, an unemployment insurance fund or a legacy from some long -
forgotten relation. 
 
The present article does not intend to focus on financial crimes in general, however, 
but specifically on crimes where information is obtained in an unauthorized manner. 
A good example would be the action described as  "phishing", where the criminal's 
aim is not so much to obtain money directly, but to obtain information that would 
enable him (or her) to gain access to the victim's Internet accounts at a later stage. 
                                        
85   The aim of Individual Deterrence. 
86   The aim of Retribution. 
87   The aim of General Deterrence. 
88   It seems that the abolition of the death penalty in South Africa has led to inflation as far as 
prison terms are  concerned. One often hears of a "double" or "triple" life sentence being 
imposed by courts. In practice, however, prisoners usually serve only a fraction of their prison 
terms behind bars, mostly being released on an early parole. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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Inadequate passwords or password procedures play a major role in the type of crime 
presently under discussion. 
 
Suppose,  however,  that  an  incursion  is  made  not  so  much  for  the  purposes  of 
pecuniary  gain  but  in  order  to  obtain  information  that  might  be  valuable  for  an 
entirely different purpose. Mention has already been made above to the case of Mr 
Snowden,  who  broke  through  the  security  systems  of  American  government 
departments and thus obtained strategic government information that he then made 
openly  available  on  the  Internet.  The  almost  hysterical  reaction  from  the 
government makes one wonder whether this matter really turned on normal law 
enforcement with a view to protecting American citizens, or whether the state was 
annoyed  and  discomfited  because  its  own  "strategic"  and  secret  information  had 
been accessed. Throughout this drama, Snowden claimed that it would be to the 
public  benefit  to  know  what  kind  of  personal  information  the  government  was 
storing for its own benefit, not for that of its citizens. 
 
The  conclusion  seems  inescapable  that  the  real  "victims"  of  Snowden's  "crimes" 
were  not  the  individual  citizens  of  the  United  States,  but  powerful  government 
officials  (some  of  them  quite  high  up  in  the  hierarchy)  who  did  not  want  to  be 
exposed to the glare of open, constitutional, public scrutiny. 
 
Similarly,  Bradley  Manning  has  been  convicted  in  connection  with  a  breach  of 
military and diplomatic secrets. In 2010 Manning, a 22-year old army intelligence 
analyst serving in Iraq, had sent thousands of documents that had been classified as 
secret  by  the  American  military  to  the  website  "Wikileaks",  which  had  published 
them  electronically.  Manning  did  not  believe  that  he  had  been acting  unlawfully, 
writing that "Information should be free", before his later capture.
89 
 
                                        
89   Quoted in Scherer 2013 Time 18ff. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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Aaron  Swartz,  a  computer  programmer,  was  to  be  charged  for  downloading 
academic  papers  from  MIT  and  JSTOR.
90  However,  the  26 -year  old  committed 
suicide before he could be brought to trial.
91 Again, Swartz seemed to be more of a 
"conscientious objector" than a common criminal - he had downloaded and released 
publicly millions of federal court documents in protest of a per-page fee for access to 
such documents, a tariff that would make research much more expensive. 
 
It is significant that these three "criminals" were all still in their 20s and probably did 
not believe that they were doing wrong  - or at any rate, that the end justified the 
means. In South Africa  "political  or other not ignoble motives "  may serve as an 
extenuating circumstance. Nonetheless, the young offenders described above all 
faced "having the book thrown at them" as far as their sentences were concerned. 
Time magazine
92 states that according to a poll recently conducted by the magazine, 
53% of respondents were of the opinion that Snowden  should be prosecuted, 
compared to a mere 28% who thought that he should just be  "sent on his way". 
However, once the responses are limited to Snowden's own age group (of 18 to 34-
year olds), 43% felt that he should not be prosecuted. 
 
In commentary published with the above Time article,
93 mention is made of a shift in 
judicial  views  as  far  as  weighing  up  security  against  privacy  considerations  is 
concerned. During the First World War the Espionage Act of 1917 was enacted in the 
United States and President Woodrow Wilson called for this law to be used in order 
to suppress criticism of the country's participation in this war. 
 
The majority of the Supreme Court gave effect to this appeal from the Executive and 
convicted several antiwar critics in terms of the Act. However, in the case of Abrams 
                                        
90   Short  for  "Journal  Storage"  -  a  digital  library  of  academic  articles,  books  and  other  primary 
sources - see JSTOR 2014 http://www.jstor.org. 
91   Scherer 2013 Time 22. 
92   Scherer 2013 Time 22. 
93   Scherer 2013  Time  24. The author is Jeffrey Ros en, the president and CEO of the National 
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v United States,
94 Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr , and Louis Brandeis upheld a 
different  minority  view,  saying  that  even  loathsome  opi nions  should  not  be 
suppressed unless these are so threatening that they should be checked in order to 
save the country. The latter opinion finally won the day in 1969 in the case of 
Brandenburg v Ohio,
95  where the court decided that there had to be both th e 
intention to bring about as well as a likelihood of imminent violence before free 
speech could be suppressed. 
 
In a follow-up on the same point discussed in the previous paragraphs, a later  Time 
magazine article
96 delivered the following insightful commentary: 
 
The  motivations  of  Manning  and  Snowden  fall  under  the  Ideology/Identification 
subset of the FBI's insider-threat category: "a desire to help an '"underdog'" or a 
particular cause". That cause is open government, and to its champions, Manning 
and Snowden are heroes whose leaks are a public service. What matters next may 
have less to do with the punishment that is meted out than with how many people 
with security clearances decide to follow in their footsteps. 
 
The  failure  of  a  dispute  resolution  between  two  major  United  States  software 
providers, Microsoft and Google,
97 on the one hand, and the American government 
on the other, has again highlighted the double role that a government might have to 
play in similar cases. On the one hand, it has the administrative power to weigh up 
interests and to see to it that justice is done to all. On the other hand, it might be a 
player itself in the information game, capable of misusing the position of trust that 
has been given to it. The excuse of protecting the security and safety of its citizens 
may be valid in some instances, but should not serve to hide extreme actions behind 
a veil of administrative obscurity. 
 
A civil suit will now reportedly be brought by the tw o software houses against an 
order forcing them to comply with secret requests by the American government (in 
                                        
94   Abrams v United States 250 US (1919) 616. 
95   Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US (1969) 444. 
96   Anon 2013 Time 13. 
97   Anon 2013 http://www.news24.com/Technology/News/Microsoft-joins-Google-in-US-spying-suit-
20130831. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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terms of the Foreign Intelligence Survey Act) for private user data. The plaintiffs 
want  "to  be  able  to  provide  users  with  better  insight  into  what  information  the 
government gets its hands on". On the other hand, the government insists that such 
requests are perfectly lawful and "have helped thwart dozens of terrorist attacks". 
 
3.3  Uganda 
 
In  a  spate  of  new  internet-related  legislation  during  2011,  Uganda  passed  a 
Computer Misuse Act,
98 an Electronic Signatures Act
99 and an Electronic Commerce 
Act.
100  These  new  Acts  should  bring  the  country  into  the  age  of  electronic 
commerce,  provided  that  the  necessary  training  is  done  and  the  legislation  is 
properly enforced. 
 
Taken in isolation not much fault can be found with the new trio of laws, but a fair 
amount  of  mutual  overlap  seem  to  exist  between  them.  Thus  Part  V  - 
(Miscellaneous) of the Electronic Commerce Act contains a number of provisions that 
create  offences,  which  should  perhaps  rather  have  been  enacted  under  the 
Computer Misuse Act.
101 
 
In turn, the latter Act contains a number of evidential and procedural provisions in 
Part III (Investigations and Procedures) and Part V (Miscellaneous). Seeing that Part 
V  contains  some  really  important  provisions  concerning  criminal  procedure  and 
evidential admissibility, these other provisions are probably not correctly placed 
under this heading. 
 
Part IV of the Act (Computer Misuse Offences) sets out the statutory of fences and 
follows the pattern of the South African Act, but only up to a point. It then proceeds 
                                        
98   Computer Misuse Act 2 of 2011. 
99   Electronic Signatures Act 7 of 2011. 
100   Electronic Commerce Act 8 of 2011. 
101   Alternatively the E-commerce enactment could have contained the necessary crime provisions, 
as with South Africa's ECT Act. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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to  criminalise  actions  such  as  involvement  in  child  pornography,
102  "cyber 
harassment", "offensive communication" and "cyber stalking". 
 
While most of the above  seem to be progress in the right direction, the Act also 
contains a more controversial Section 20 on  "Enhanced Punishment for offences 
involving protected computers". This section places the onus on an accused to prove 
that  he  or  she  did  not  know  that  the   computer  concerned  was  "protected". 
Subsection 20(2) defines this type of machine as follows: 
 
For  the  purposes  of  subsection  (1),  a  computer  is  treated  as  a  "protected 
computer" if the person committing the offence knows or ought reasonably to have 
known, that the computer or program or data is used directly in connection with or 
necessary for- 
(a) the security, defence or international relations of Uganda; 
(b) the existence or identity of a confidential source of information relating to the 
enforcement of a criminal law; 
(c)  the  provision  of  services  directly  related  to  communications  infrastructure, 
banking and financial services, public utilities or public key infrastructure; or 
(d) the protection of public safety including systems related to 
essential emergency services such as police, civil defence and medical services. 
 
In connection with the onus of proof, subsection 20(3) provides as follows: 
 
For the purposes of any prosecution under this section, it shall be presumed, until 
the contrary is proved, that the accused has the requisite knowledge referred to in 
subsection (2). 
 
With all due respect, the above section seems to load the dice too heavily in favour 
of the State. Not only does the accused bear the full onus of proof with regard to his 
(or  her)  own  innocence,  but  culpa
103  seems to be sufficient for a conviction. By 
including data used in connection with "public utilities" in the enhanced punishment-
provision, a court may now  "throw the book" at sleepy employees of municipal or 
state utilities - hardly the targets of such a drastic "spy" provision. 
 
                                        
102   Which South Africa deals with in separate legislation. 
103   "Ought reasonably to have known". D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
319 
The  Electronic  Signatures  Act  introduces  the  PKI-infrastructure  as  the  prescribed 
method of encryption. This is a standard that has been accepted all over the world 
and not much can be criticised about the standard itself. Again the only concern 
seems to be if Uganda possesses the necessary skilled manpower and sophisticated 
hardware  in  order  to  obtain  the  necessary  qualified  expert  evidence  regarding 
findings made after using such systems. 
 
4  Conclusion 
 
The survey done above on the international legal position (especially in the United 
States) as well as on certain areas of South African and Ugandan law is not yet 
complete. The thoughtful reader would, however, have perceived already how the 
arrival of digital information has changed the entire background against which the 
law has to operate. The Internet is not only a new global marketplace, but digital 
police ought to be patrolling the precinct to prevent digital crime. On the other hand, 
it would be very easy for the State to overreach its powers in this regard and to start 
using  this  new  medium  as  a  useful  spying  tool.
104  The traditional, finely tuned 
balance between the powers of government and those of its citizens are being 
shaken and should be addressed by visionary law making and enforcement. A third 
force that the present article has not had the time to dissect and analyse properly is 
the power of the digital marketplace. Citizens might not mind giving up their right to 
privacy, provided that they get paid for doing so. 
 
Even though academics might have time to study and carefully dissect the changes 
brought about by the information revolution, most practitioners simply do not have 
the time to study these quantum changes that are taking place in the field of IT, and 
to think through their full implications for the law. 
 
                                        
104   Here one thinks of "Big Brother" (the over-active government) in works such as George Orwell's 
1984. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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In this regard, not only universities but also the government, the organised legal 
profession
105  and the security and IT industries ought to sit down together and 
decide on the way forward as far as the interface between digital information and 
the law is concerned. An overhaul and consolidation of existing legislation is needed, 
but the legislature should also be enabled to react much quicker to the fast -moving 
digital world.
106 Not only legal practitioners should be involved in this collaboration, 
but also experts from the security and IT industries. Part of the programme should 
concern the planning and financing of the necessary training. Standards need to be 
agreed upon, especially to provide reliable proof in highly technical cases. 
 
One strategic advantage locally is that overseas countries, some of them much 
further along the digital path than Africa, have been confronted with exactly the 
same problems, but for a much longer time than we have. The world has become a 
much smaller place and this continent may learn a lot from its overseas neighbours 
as far as best practices are concerned. Comparative research would therefore also 
be of the utmost importance in this regard. 
 
Speaking from an international perspective, however, traditional legal solutions for 
problems with regard to jurisdiction on the Internet, for instance, are badly in need 
of a rethink. International standards and treaties between countries could go some 
way towards addressing this problem. We should start thinking outside of traditional 
boundaries in more ways than one. 
 
As for citizens'  tussle with their own governments with regard   to their personal 
information - the old aphorism might still hold some truth: "If ye sup with the devil, 
use a long spoon." 
                                        
105   Here one thinks of the Bar and Sidebar, Justice Training etc. 
106   The  over-long  process  attendant  on  the  promulgation  of  South  Africa's  privacy  legislation 
constitutes a prime example. D VAN DER MERWE     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
EAC      East African Community 
ECT    Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
FBI      Federal Bureau of Investigation 
GCHQ   United Kingdom's Government Communications Headquarters 
GILA    General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill 
Harv LJ  Harvard Law Journal 
ICT      Information and Communications Technology 
IP      Intellectual Property 
ISO      International Standards Organisation 
JSTOR    Journal Storage 
MIT      Massachusetts Institute for Technology 
NSA    United States' National Security Agency 
PKI      Public Key Infrastructure 
PGP      Pretty Good Privacy 
POSI     Protection of State Information (Bill) 
SAAA     South African Accreditation Authority 
SACC    South African Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
SADC     South African Development Community 
SALRC   South African Law Reform Commission 
THRHR  Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
UHRC     Ugandan Human Rights Commission 
XBRL     (e)Xtensible Business Reporting Language 
XML      (e)Xtensible Markup Language 
 